Appendix 1: Significant matters
Explore ways to facilitate development of the impact investment market and encourage innovation in funding social service delivery.
Provide guidance to superannuation trustees on the appropriateness of impact investment.
Support law reform to classify a private ancillary fund as a 'sophisticated' or 'professional' investor, where the founder of the fund meets those definitions.
Impact investing allows investors to pursue opportunities that provide both social and financial returns. This innovative form of funding is growing globally as a valuable mechanism to support social service delivery. Changing community expectations about the role of government and the financial sector in funding social service delivery highlight a need for this funding mechanism in Australia.
Impact investment can occur through direct investment in not-for-profit or social enterprises. Alternatively, it can be intermediated by community development financial institutions, social banks and impact investment fund managers. These intermediaries play a valuable role in channelling impact investment funds as well as building capacity in not-for-profit and social enterprises to attract impact investment funds.
Importantly, impact investing has the potential to benefit government and taxpayers by reducing costs and improving social policy outcomes. It can change the role of Government from paying for inputs to paying for outcomes. It can also benefit not-for-profits by diversifying their funding sources and helping them to develop technical expertise in benchmarking and measuring outcomes, as well as improving governance and accountability.
Given the potential benefits of social impact investment and its current limited use in Australia, the Interim Report sought feedback on market impediments. The Inquiry agrees with stakeholders who suggest that clarifying some aspects of regulation would facilitate market development, including:
- Clearer guidance from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) on the appropriateness of impact investment for superannuation trustees. Currently, guidance is limited.
- Government should amend the law to facilitate private ancillary funds established and controlled by 'sophisticated' or 'professional' investors accessing wholesale offerings for social impact bonds.1
Many stakeholders argue that Government should play a more active role to facilitate the social impact investment market in Australia, although views vary on the nature of this role.2 The Inquiry agrees “Government intervention can play a catalytic role both in facilitating the functioning of the ecosystem and targeting actions to trigger its further development. However, these actions should provide incentives for the engagement, not the replacement of the private sector and should be conducted in a manner conducive of the market”.3
The Inquiry sees merit in Government facilitating the impact investment market. Government's involvement should include coordinating interested private sector parties, providing expertise on social service delivery and performance measurement, and offering explicit public endorsement for the significant private sector interest in this emerging market.
Retail corporate bond market
Reduce disclosure requirements for large listed corporates issuing 'simple' bonds and encourage industry to develop standard terms for 'simple' bonds.
Australia has an established domestic bond market. However, a range of constraints, including tax and regulatory settings, have limited the market's development — in particular, the retail corporate bond market. The Interim Report discusses these issues further.4
For corporates, the disclosure requirements for a retail corporate bond issue are more onerous and costly than for domestic wholesale issuance. Although the new 'simple' corporate bonds legislation reduces the cost of disclosure documentation, it is still greater than for a domestic wholesale issue.5 Less onerous disclosure requirements for listed securities would make retail issuance simpler and more cost effective.
The Inquiry considers that Government should amend the law to reduce disclosure requirements for large listed corporate issuers of 'simple' bonds. The disclosure regime should comprise a term sheet for a standardised product and a cleansing notice. In addition, industry — assisted by the Australian Financial Markets Association — should develop standard terms and conditions for 'simple' bonds, which would also help reduce disclosure costs. The Inquiry believes that the proposed regime would strike the right balance between reducing issuance costs and providing potential investors with sufficient information to make a considered investment decision.
Stakeholders generally agree, and suggest that the documentation costs would be broadly aligned with those for domestic wholesale issuance.6 Given the proposed disclosure regime is similar to current requirements for a domestic wholesale issue, it would also reduce the administrative burden of a retail offer associated with a wholesale issue.
Broadly, submissions and stakeholders agree that, at least initially, the new disclosure regime should not be available to smaller corporates on the listed equity market. In general, investors have the benefit of more market research and publicly available information for larger corporates. Larger corporates are also more likely to be repeat issuers and thus be subject to market discipline regarding the quality of their disclosures.
The Inquiry considers that the new regime should only be available to the top 150 companies by market capitalisation on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). This is broadly consistent with the views of stakeholders. Government should review this limit after two years to determine whether the regime should be extended to smaller corporates.
Unfair contract term provisions
Support Government's process to extend unfair contract term protections to small businesses.
Encourage industry to develop standards on the use of non-monetary default covenants.
Protections from unfair contract term (UCT) provisions under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 currently do not apply to small business loans or business-to-business lending. The UCT provisions are limited to consumer contracts: those in which at least one party is an individual acquiring goods or services wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.
Several submissions suggest that some non-monetary loan covenants are unfair and lenders could be more transparent when exercising them.
The Inquiry supports Government's public consultation and policy development process for extending the coverage of UCT protections under standard form contracts to small businesses. Although such protections would not prevent unfair terms in non-standard contracts, the Inquiry believes this approach may improve broader contracting practices and the fair exercise of rights pursuant to non-monetary default covenants. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) could also make protections more effective by clarifying its intent to enforce UCT provisions.
More broadly, the Inquiry encourages the banking industry to adjust its code of practice to address non-monetary default covenants. The Code of Banking Practice and the Customer Owned Banking Code of Practice could require banks to give borrowers sufficient notice of changes to covenants and of an intention to enforce —which could give a borrower reasonable time to obtain alternative financing. Such adjustments to industry practice would also provide greater scope and guidance for the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee and the Financial Ombudsman Service to deal with relevant complaints.
Clearly differentiate the investment products that finance companies and similar entities offer retail consumers from authorised deposit-taking institution deposits.
Finance companies operate under an exemption from the Banking Act 1959. They differ from authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) because they raise funds by issuing debt securities rather than by accepting deposits. Although most Australian finance companies source their funding from wholesale investors, some smaller entities target consumers. The period since the global financial crisis has seen numerous failures of finance companies, resulting in significant losses. In the wake of these failures, it has become apparent that some consumers did not appreciate the difference between finance companies and ADIs.7 This problem was exacerbated by finance companies using bank account–like terminology and allowing consumers to access funds at call.
The Inquiry considered whether to ban finance companies from accepting retail funds from consumers. However, it recognises that well-run finance companies can play a useful role in the market. It also considered whether they should be prudentially regulated by ASIC — an approach considered by the former Government following the collapse of Banksia Securities. However, the Inquiry does not recommend that ASIC's mandate be extended in this way. The Inquiry considers that the best approach would be to differentiate the products of finance companies from accounts offered by ADIs. The Inquiry therefore recommends APRA ban finance companies from offering at-call products to retail consumers and from using bank account–like terminology.
Corporate administration and bankruptcy
Consult on possible amendments to the external administration regime to provide additional flexibility for businesses in financial difficulty.
The Interim Report asked stakeholders about the efficiency of Australia's external administration regime.8 Submissions indicate that Australia's external administration provisions are generally working well and do not require wholesale revision. Stakeholders present little evidence to suggest the Australian regime causes otherwise viable businesses to fail. However, submissions highlight that a few elements of the United States Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 11 insolvency framework merit consideration.9
Submissions argue that directors should be protected by 'safe harbour' provisions that permit restructuring efforts for firms in financial difficulty without invoking external administration processes. These protections would only apply where directors seek expert assistance. Stakeholders also suggest extending the safe harbour protection to the expert restructuring advisers to prevent them from being considered de facto directors. Further, stakeholders suggest that ipso facto clauses be suspended from operating during the restructuring efforts.10
The Inquiry recognises more work needs to be done to assess the potential value of these proposals and recommends Government conducts stakeholder consultation on these matters.
The current Australian external administration regime has other complexities:
- In some cases, external administration and bankruptcy processes overlap, causing disproportionate complexity and cost. This particularly affects small and medium-sized enterprises, where the owner faces personal bankruptcy if their incorporated business fails.
- Complaints and dispute resolution processes relating to the external administration regime could be improved. ASIC is currently implementing measures to enhance existing processes.
- Elements of external administration and bankruptcy regulation are not technology neutral and efficiencies available from digital processes are not being used.
Government consultation has commenced on measures to address elements of the first two of these issues. Recommendation 39: Technology neutrality in this appendix addresses the third.
Superannuation member engagement
Publish retirement income projections on member statements from defined contribution superannuation schemes using Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) regulatory guidance.
Facilitate access to consolidated superannuation information from the Australian Taxation Office to use with ASIC's and superannuation funds' retirement income projection calculators.
Research indicates that giving consumers retirement income projections improves their engagement with saving for retirement.11 However, many superannuation funds do not provide retirement income projections on member statements. All members need to understand their projected retirement income to make informed decisions about their retirement savings. Where possible, all funds should provide meaningful retirement income projections on member statements, including scenarios to alert members to sequencing risk, based on the standard assumptions described in ASIC's requirements for superannuation forecasts.12 This would benefit members at a relatively small cost to superannuation funds.
Superannuation funds can only provide a partial perspective of retirement incomes for members who have multiple accounts and wealth accumulated outside of superannuation. Online calculators enable individuals to enter all their information — superannuation fund and asset balances—to obtain a more accurate retirement income projection, including any income from the Age Pension. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO), which holds consolidated superannuation information across multiple accounts, could provide that information for use in calculators, which could initially be accessed from the ATO's myGov superannuation portal. This would assist funds to design calculators that provide retirement income projections based on the comprehensive income product for retirement they offer members (see Recommendation 11: The retirement phase of superannuation in Chapter 2).
There would be small implementation costs for the ATO to link its existing myGov superannuation portal to retirement income calculators.
Update the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy to reflect changes in the threat environment, improve cohesion in policy implementation, and progress public–private sector and cross-industry collaboration.
Establish a formal framework for cyber security information sharing and response to cyber threats.
As observed in the Interim Report, cyber attacks are increasing in frequency and sophistication.13 The financial industry is a major target of cyber crime and is under increasing threat as the number of high-value targets in the sector grows. Major industry participants raise cyber security as a significant risk to their viability and to the financial system. A financial sector cyber crisis could result in system-wide impacts and significant consumer detriment.
The growth in interconnectivity, increasing network speeds and broad distribution of technology mean that responses to cyber threats by individual institutions are necessary but, in some cases, insufficient. Many industry participants suggest the cyber security of the financial system is only as strong as its 'weakest link', requiring efforts by both Government and industry to strengthen capacity to respond in an effective and coordinated way.
Australia has a Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) in place, released in 2009, that outlines a whole-of-Government cyber security policy. Submissions indicate the CSS is out of date and not suited to today's threat environment. Given the rapidly changing nature of cyber space and the threat environment, Government should act to ensure Australia has an updated and cohesive CSS.
Industry participants indicate that, although they already actively monitor the threat environment and are well placed to identify vulnerabilities, the most effective responses come from combining the intelligence they hold with timely threat information held by Government. Consequently, policy and regulatory frameworks need to support effective and timely public–private sector information sharing.
Given the constant and rapid evolution of cyber threats, public–private sector coordination of cyber crisis planning — including across sectors (for example, with the telecommunications sector) — is becoming increasingly important. Industry participants in particular highlight a need to clarify the roles of the public and private sectors in a cyber crisis event to ensure a rapid, coordinated and effective response.
Updating the CSS, developing formal mechanisms for public–private sector information sharing and clarifying public and private sector roles in a cyber crisis would help to improve the resilience of the financial system. It would better prepare the financial sector, Government and other industry sectors to respond in a timely and coordinated manner to evolving cyber threats.
Identify, in consultation with the financial sector, and amend priority areas of regulation to be technology neutral.
Embed consideration of the principle of technology neutrality into development processes for future regulation.
Ensure regulation allows individuals to select alternative methods to access services to maintain fair treatment for all consumer segments.
Some regulation assumes or requires the use of certain forms of technology. For example, regulation may specify certain delivery mechanisms for products, or use terminology that assumes a paper-based environment. In other cases, new technologies put the operation of certain provisions in doubt. These circumstances can impede innovation and efficiency by preventing the uptake of new technologies that could provide better outcomes for users, businesses and government. They can also prevent government and regulators from managing risks appropriately.
Stakeholders have identified a range of priority areas for amendment, including regulation relating to financial products and services disclosure, customer consent and authorisation, payments and cheques, external administration processes, conveyancing and identity verification.14
Government should establish an industry working group to identify the priority areas of regulation to be amended for technology neutrality. A number of stakeholders have indicated their support for and willingness to be involved in such an initiative.15
Technology-neutral regulation enables any mode of technology to be used and tends to be competitively neutral. Generally, regulation should be principles-based and functional in design, focusing on outcomes rather than prescribing the method by which it should be achieved. However, the Inquiry recognises that technology specific regulation may continue to be required and be beneficial in cases where adopting a common technology standard would improve overall system efficiency. In these cases, future review mechanisms should be established to ensure technology-specific regulation does not impede innovation.
The principle of technology neutrality should be incorporated into government policy-making guides, and processes for developing future regulation. The guidance should allow for technology-specific regulation on an exceptions basis.
A technology-neutral approach to regulation enables regulators and government to adapt to innovative developments and manage risks. It can also reduce compliance costs by removing unnecessary regulatory impediments and improving the stability and longevity of regulation. It can also give financial product providers greater flexibility to innovate to meet changing consumer expectations.
Stakeholders note a potential consequence of technology-neutral regulation is that it risks excluding some community segments from the financial system.16 For example, by enabling businesses to shift to electronic service delivery as a default, older Australians or others with limited internet access may become excluded. As a result, it is important that regulation accommodates the ability of consumers to select alternative methods to access services, such as paper-based delivery.
In implementation, a phased approach may be required to manage transitional costs to industry. However, the Inquiry believes these costs would be outweighed by the longer-term efficiency benefits to industry and improved consumer outcomes.
Provision of financial advice and mortgage broking
Rename 'general advice' and require advisers and mortgage brokers to disclose ownership structures.
The current regulatory framework addresses advice on financial products. The framework makes an important distinction between personal and general advice:
- Personal advice takes account of a person's needs, objectives or personal circumstances, whereas general advice does not.
- General advice includes guidance, advertising, and promotional and sales material highlighting the potential benefits of financial products. It comes with a disclaimer stating that it does not take a consumer's personal circumstances into account.
However, consumers may misinterpret or excessively rely on guidance, advertising, and promotional and sales material when it is described as 'general advice'. The use of the word 'advice' may cause consumers to believe the information is tailored to their needs. Behavioural economics literature and ASIC's financial literacy and consumer research suggests that terminology affects consumer understanding and perceptions.17
Often consumers do not understand their financial adviser's or mortgage broker's association with product issuers. This association might limit the product range an adviser or broker can recommend from.18 Of recently surveyed consumers, 55 per cent of those receiving financial advice from an entity owned by a large financial institution (but operating under a different brand name) thought the entity was independent.19
The Inquiry believes greater transparency regarding the nature of advice and the ownership of advisers would help to build confidence and trust in the financial advice sector. In particular, 'general advice' should be replaced with a more appropriate, consumer-tested term to help reduce consumer misinterpretation and excessive reliance on this type of information. Consumer testing will generate some costs for Government, and relabelling will generate transitional costs for industry — although these are expected to be small. The Inquiry believes the benefits to consumers from clearer distinction and the reduced need for warnings outweigh these costs.
Although stakeholders have provided little evidence of differences in the quality of advice from independent or aligned and vertically integrated firms, the Inquiry sees the value to consumers in making ownership and alignment more transparent. In particular, these disclosures should be broader than Financial Services Guide and Credit Guide rules currently require, and could include branded documents or materials. The Inquiry believes the benefits to consumers would outweigh the transitional costs to industry of effecting branding changes.
Define bank accounts and life insurance policies as unclaimed monies only if they are inactive for seven years.
At present, bank accounts and life insurance policies are deemed to be unclaimed monies and transferred to Government if they are inactive for three years. The present position was changed in 2012, from a longstanding arrangement that required an inactive period of seven years.
The Australian Bankers' Association estimates that reverting to seven years would halve the number of claims.20 The Inquiry believes Government should act to ensure bank accounts and life insurance policies are deemed unclaimed after seven years of inactivity and that these monies should be held in a separate trust account.
Managed investment scheme regulation
Support Government's review of the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee's recommendations on managed investment schemes, giving priority to matters relating to:
- Consumer detriment, including illiquid schemes and freezing of funds
- Regulatory architecture impeding cross-border transactions and mutual recognition arrangements
The Inquiry received relatively few submissions on managed investment scheme (MIS) matters, possibly due to other related and concurrent Government consultations.
In 2012, following a series of high-profile scheme collapses, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) released a report into MISs that identified problems in a range of areas, including arrangements for restructuring or winding up failed schemes.21,22 The report also highlighted more fundamental concerns about schemes being used as vehicles for entrepreneurial activities rather than as passive investment vehicles. It found that most problems with the sector had arisen due to stress in 'common enterprise' schemes, where the MIS structure is favoured over the corporate structure for tax reasons. This in turn led to a number of difficulties in managing the financial distress of those schemes and consequent consumer detriment.
In 2014, CAMAC released a broad-ranging discussion paper that, among other issues, identified MIS regulatory architecture characteristics that impede other jurisdictions from recognising the equivalence of the Australian regulatory regime. Without equivalence, companies find it harder to conduct cross-border business.23
Submissions received were largely about these issues. Accordingly, the Inquiry believes these should be priority areas for Government action arising from CAMAC's work.
In addition to this recommendation, the Inquiry is making several other recommendations affecting the MIS sector, including:
- Strengthening regulators' focus on competition in the financial system, including identifying barriers to cross-border provision of financial services.
- Prioritising the rationalisation of MIS legacy products (see below).
- Removing regulatory impediments to innovative product disclosure and communication with consumers.
The Inquiry also identifies a number of taxes for consideration as part of the Tax White Paper process, such as the tax treatment of funds management vehicles (for further detail, see Appendix 2: Tax summary).
Introduce a mechanism to facilitate the rationalisation of legacy products in the life insurance and managed investments sectors.
Industry estimates suggest that approximately 25 per cent of all funds under management are in legacy products.24 These are products that are closed to new investors and have become uneconomic or rendered out of date by changes to market structure, Government policy or legislation. Legacy products increase costs to fund managers and life insurers. They can also prevent consumers from accessing better features in newer products.
Between 2007 and 2010, Government worked with industry to develop a mechanism to facilitate product rationalisation, focusing on the managed investments and life insurance sectors — superannuation was considered less problematic as there was already a successor fund transfer mechanism in relevant legislation. However, Government did not finalise or implement the mechanism.
The mechanism would have facilitated rationalisation of genuine legacy products — that is, not simply those that are performing poorly — subject to a 'no disadvantage test' for relevant consumers. It would also have provided tax relief to ensure consumers were not disadvantaged as a result of triggering an early capital gains tax event.
The Inquiry sees benefit in such a mechanism for product rationalisation that treats consumers fairly. Given the cost of implementing the mechanism, the Inquiry considers it should initially be limited to managed investments and life insurance, and that it should be subject to a cost recovery mechanism, such as an application fee. The application fee could be designed to offset process administration costs and incorporate economic incentives to ensure rationalisation targets the most problematic areas.
Corporations Act 2001 ownership restrictions
Remove market ownership restrictions from the Corporations Act 2001 once the current reforms to cross-border regulation of financial market infrastructure are complete.
An additional restriction on the ASX's ownership, over and above the Foreign Investment Review Board national interest test, was introduced on the exchange's demutualisation in 1998. The rationale for this restriction was concern about a possible conflict of interest in the ASX's role as a market co-regulator. However, responsibility for market supervision has now been transferred to ASIC, and proposals are underway to allow for stronger cross-border regulation.25
Government should act to remove market ownership restrictions for the ASX to make it subject to the same ownership restrictions as other entities in the financial sector.
1 Impact Investment Group 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 6–7.
2 Westpac 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 50; Impact Investing Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 5; Impact Investment Group 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 9.
3 Impact Investing Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 10 citing: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2011, Financing high-growth firms: the role of angel investors, OECD, Paris, page 124.
4 Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, pages 2-86 to 2-87.
5 The Corporations Amendment (Simple Corporate Bonds and Other Measures) Bill 2014 became law on 11 September 2014. The regime is not fully implemented, as much of the structure and content of disclosure requirements are to be set by regulation and have only recently been released for public consultation.
6 Based on an industry survey conducted by the Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA). AFMA 2014, Data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 1 October 2014.
7 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2014, First round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 83.
8 Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, page 2-69.
9 Chapter 11 refers to “… the chapter of the US Bankruptcy Code providing (generally) for reorganisation, usually involving a corporation or partnership”. United States Courts, Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code, United States Courts, Washington, DC, viewed 23 October 2014.
10 Ipso facto clauses deem a company to be in default in circumstances approaching insolvency; for instance, where there has been a 'material adverse change' in a company's financial circumstances. Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2003, Rehabilitating large and complex enterprises in financial difficulties, CAMAC, Sydney, paragraph 1.44, page 9.
11 Goda, G, Manchester, C, Sojourner, A 2012, What's my account really worth? The effect of lifetime income disclosure on retirement savings, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 17927.
12 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Regulatory Guide 229: Superannuation forecasts, ASIC, Sydney.
13 Commonwealth of Australia 2014, Financial System Inquiry Interim Report, Canberra, page 4-55.
14 Including: Mercer 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 57-58; King & Wood Mallesons 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 33–34; PEXA (Property Exchange Australia) 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, pages 7–9; Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry (main document), page 3.
15 Commonwealth Bank 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 60.
16 Refer, for example, to National Seniors Australia 2014, Second round submission to the Financial System Inquiry, page 29.
17 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2013, Report 378: Consumer testing of the MySuper product dashboard, ASIC, Sydney, page 22; ASIC 2013, Report 341: Retail investor research into structured capital protected and capital guaranteed investments, ASIC, Sydney; Susan Bell Research 2008, The provision of consumer research regarding financial product disclosure documents, Financial Services Working Group, Sydney.
18 ASIC's review of Future of Financial Advice reform implementation observed that approximately 63 per cent of licensees in the sample tested were affiliated with financial product issuers. Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 2014, Report 407: Review of the financial advice industry's implementation of the FOFA reforms, ASIC, Sydney, page 19.
19 In contrast, only 14 per cent of consumers considered financial planners working under the brand of the same financial institution to be independent. Roy Morgan Research 2014, data provided to the Financial System Inquiry, 7 November 2014.
20 Australian Banker's Association 2014, Submission in response to the Treasury discussion paper: Options for Improving the Unclaimed Bank Account and Life Insurance Money Provisions, page 2.
21 Collapses were experienced primarily in the agribusiness sector.
22 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2012, Managed investment schemes, CAMAC, Sydney.
23 Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) 2014, The establishment of managed investment schemes, CAMAC, Sydney.
24 Financial Services Council (formerly Investment and Financial Services Association Ltd) 2009, Second round submission to Australia's Future Tax System Review, page 5.
25 Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) 2014, Application of the Regulatory Influence Framework for Cross-border Central Counterparties, CFR, Sydney; Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2012, Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia, RBA, Sydney; Stevens, G 2012, Review of Financial Market Infrastructure Regulation, letter to the Hon. Wayne Swan, MP (Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer), 10 February.